The Zombocom Problem
Welcome to zombocom… you can do anything at zombocom… anything at all… the only limit… is yourself…
This is the Zombocom Problem: sure, it can be anything, but first it has to be something specific.
Many attempts at no-code, low-code, nodes-and-wires, end-user programming, wikis, malleable software, moldable development, super apps, protocols, and platforms have failed because of the Zombocom Problem.
People don’t want “anything at all”. They want something specific. To succeed, you need to solve a specific problem for a specific user and find specific product-market fit.
Sure, Amazon is the everything store, but first it had to be the book store.
Three years ago I was in New York City working for a quantitative hedge fund, when I came across the startling statistic that web usage was growing at 2300% a year.
So I decided I would try and find a business plan that made sense in the context of that growth, and I picked books as the first best product to sell online after making a list of like 20 different products that you might be able to sell.
And books were great as the first best, because books are incredibly unusual in one respect: that is that there are more items in the book category then there are items in any other category by far.
Music is number two. There are about two hundred thousand active music CDs at any given time.
But in the book space there are more than three million different books worldwide active and printed at any given time across all languages. More than one and a half million in English alone.
So when you have that many items you can literally build a store online that couldn't exist any other way.
Books were the edge-of-the-wedge for Amazon. They were a great product, because they were shelf stable, easy to ship, easy to handle, and could compete on catalog size.
Books also offered an easy gradient into adjacent categories like music. First Amazon was the book store, then the books and music store, then the books and music and… Bezos landed, then expanded into adjacent market after adjacent market, until Amazon grew from the something store to the everything store.
The Zombocom problem explains why spreadsheets succeeded, where many other end-user-programming platforms failed.
The whole world runs on Excel. Name a data-intensive critical industry: deep-sea oil drilling? Power grid management? International finance? All powered by Excel at critical junctures.
(ng12 on HackerNews)
Spreadsheets are used by everyone for everything, but first they had to be used by someone for something specific. Spreadsheets had to find a first best customer.
This is VisiCalc, the first spreadsheet program:
Who was VisiCalc for? Who was the first best customer?
They knew exactly who: business owners and accountants. More specifically, small business owners who couldn’t afford a full-time accountant. This was the edge-of-the-wedge for spreadsheets.
“We’re building a platform, not a product”. If you hear this, run away. Platforms come from products, not the other way around.
People don’t buy platforms. They buy one product at a time that somehow differentiates itself from every other product in their life. And then they move onto the next one. And the next one. You need to make standalone, great products, and if they can eventually all talk to each other 10 or 20 years down the line, then great.
(Tony Fadell, founder of Nest, lead engineer who oversaw invention of the iPod)
A product solves a specific problem for a specific user. Platforms have to start here too. Otherwise, they’re DOA.
I’m interested in building software that is organic, open-ended, and evolving… squishy computers. A squishy computer is pliable, re-shapable, open-ended, true to its materials as a universal machine.
So but how do we build software that can be anything without falling into the Zombocom trap? I believe that Bezos interview shows us exactly how.
You start from a systems-level insight (the internet is growing rapidly)
Then work backwards to a first best customer who has a burning need (can’t find book) that is related to your superpower (internet allows unlimited shelf space).
This customer acts as the edge-of-the-wedge for expanding into adjacent use cases (next best customer is music)
Bezo’s approach is sublime. It holds two seemingly irreconcilable insights in tension and transcends either lesser alternative:
A single-purpose product knows its customer, but tends to paint itself into a corner without systems-level insight. Instead of landing and expanding, it ends up going deeper and deeper into its vertical.
A systemic platform has massive growth potential, but tends to flop without a first best customer. It’s sometimes possible to overcome this with a massive push distribution channel, but the truth is, if you build it, they won’t always come.
Starting from that systems-level insight and working back to the first best customer requires two different skillsets, two different ways of seeing.
From the outside, it may look like you’re diving deep into a vertical and building a single-purpose product. Systems thinkers don’t like that. They want to generalize the system.
From the inside, it may feel like you’re spending a lot of time on theory. Product thinkers don’t like that. They want to think about the customer.
But holding both of these contradictory perspectives in your head at once is a superpower. Doing the hard work of systems-thinking up front allows you to uncover exponential opportunities. Working back to a first best customer sharpens your edge-of-the-wedge.
It can be anything, but first it has to be something specific.